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Introduction 
 The years leading up to 1973 were turbulent years for American and West German 
foreign policy. The relations with China were improving thanks to the efforts of National 
Security Advisor Kissinger and President Nixon and the Cold War had reached a period of 
détente, combined with the SALT I agreements. These were great achievements in foreign 
policy. However, the war in Vietnam was still in progress, exhausting most of the resources of 
the State Department. A year later the internal situation had vastly shifted. The Watergate 
scandal had started to unfold, leaving Nixon occupied with internal affairs. Henry Kissinger 
managed most of the foreign affairs, even though he was not yet Secretary of State, but only 
the National Security Advisor. In West Germany Willy Brandt and his social-democratic 
government were overhauling West German foreign policy, opting for renewed relations with 
the communist countries and their other half, the German Democratic Republic. This was a 
massive shift from the Hallstein doctrine of the Christian-democratic governments that 
preceded them, which had forbidden the recognition of East Germany. 
 Subsequently there was an American plan to make 1973 the Year of Europe. The 
initiative was publicly announced by Kissinger on April 23.1 The original Atlantic Charter 
was a document drafted during World War II by the United States and the United Kingdom, 
and later approved by the other Allied nations. The original document sketched out ideas for 
after World War II, such as self-determination and global cooperation on economic and social 
issues. These were not detailed plans, but only rough outlines for the post-war world.2 The 
new Atlantic Charter was supposed to be its spiritual successor, which reaffirmed the values 
that the original Charter proposed. The name would later be changed to ‘Declaration of 
Principles’ because of German opposition to the term Atlantic Charter, as they had not been 
part of the Allies. 
 The European countries involved, the nine countries that formed the European 
Economic Community (EEC), nicknamed ‘the Nine’, did not initially take too well to this 
initiative. Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel, who had already planned a trip to meet with Nixon 
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and Kissinger in the White House in May, were the first who were able to discuss the Year of 
Europe in person.3 
The primary reason for the Year of Europe project was the rebuilding of relations with 
Western Europe. Although the ties with China and Russia had been renewed in the previous 
years, the alliances with European countries had been neglected by the United States.4 Europe 
on the other hand had been a growing continent, after recovering from World War II. The 
European Economic Community had been founded and was growing, having admitted 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom at the beginning of 1973. One of the key nations 
of the EEC was the Federal Republic of Germany. Though the country had suffered during 
World War II, by 1973 it had wholly recuperated, having experienced a so called 
“Wirtschaftswunder”, an economic revival, in the 1950s. This would not have been possible 
without the American Marshall Plan.5 Next to the economic assistance, the United States 
provided Germany and Western Europe with military assistance. This came in multiple ways, 
for example, by having troops in the area, but also by having a nuclear guarantee, neither of 
which Germany had. 6  This cooperation and assistance were all combined in multiple 
organizations and agreements that had been set up after World War II. The Marshall Plan (or 
the European Recovery Plan) was organized in 1947 to help Europe recover by providing 
them with money and materials. On the military end the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) was established in 1949, an organization to unite Western Europe, the USA and 
Canada against attacks from the communist world and later on especially the Warsaw Pact. 
Within Europe there were developments between countries such as the European Coal and 
Steel Community, European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic 
Community. These were designed, respectively, to create a common market for coal and steel 
so Europe would be a more united front, to create a European organization and market for 
nuclear power, and to integrate Europe economically.7 
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 Though West Germany had relied on the United States for assistance during these 
early years, by 1973, almost thirty years after the end of World War II, their relationship was 
in a recession.8 When Willy Brandt was elected in West Germany in 1969, he started working 
on a new Ostpolitik, through which he sought to better the relations with the communist world, 
in particular East Germany and the Soviet Union. Ostpolitik in short was the active 
engagement with the communist countries and the German Democratic Republic, and will be 
explained in more detail later in this thesis. This was extraordinary, because up to 1970 the 
West German government in Bonn had not recognized the East German capital in Berlin 
under the Hallstein doctrine.9 During the Nixon years West Germany was mostly ignored 
from the American side, as their focus was elsewhere.10 For the United States, cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and West Germany or even a unified Germany was not a positive 
scenario, because a strong – potentially unified – Germany, allied with the Soviet Union, 
could spell a lot of difficulties for them. 
 But in 1973 West Germany still relied on the United States to guarantee them that they 
did not have to fear the Soviet Union. During the Year of Europe, which overlapped into 1974, 
attempts were made to rekindle the bond with Europe. Certain people played an important 
role in this year: Henry Kissinger, the American National Security Advisor, the German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of Germany Walter 
Scheel and the German ambassador in Washington, Berndt von Staden, amongst others. 
President Nixon was not an important participant of the Year, having most of his time 
occupied by the Watergate Scandal at home, though he did leave a mark on it, because of his 
absence. 
 This thesis focuses on how the relations between the United States and West Germany 
changed in 1973 and 1974. The main question is then: how did the United States – West 
German relations change in 1973 and 1974 during the Year of Europe? Subsequent questions 
are: were the United States – West German relations affected by the Year of Europe as 
proposed in the speech by Henry Kissinger? How did West Germany react to this, as they 
needed the United States as an ally? And how did West Germany react through the European 
Economic Community and NATO?  
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 A lot has been written about the relation between the United States and Germany, but 
this part of history seems to not yet be fully documented. Works have been written on both 
the Netherlands and France during the Year of Europe, but Germany is left out. This is odd 
because secondary literature certainly indicates that there were communications between 
Germany, the United States, and European countries concerning the Year of Europe, after 
Kissinger had given his speech.11 Secondly, as stated before, Germany had become a stable 
power on the European stage in 1973. The country was blossoming again, economically and 
politically, thirty years after World War II. They were also part of the EEC, which was a 
growing organization. But on their eastern border they could still be threatened by the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact, despite the politics of détente and Ostpolitik.12 However, the 
principal indication that the Year of Europe had an impact in Germany can be derived from a 
speech by chancellor Brandt in the Bundestag in 1974. When provoked by the opposition in 
the Bundestag, mostly comprised of the Christian democratic parties CDU/CSU, in the 
meeting of 28 March 1974, he replied viciously. Brandt asserted that, contradictory to what 
his predecessors in the debate said, there had been a West German reaction to Kissinger’s 
speech, and not just one that was drafted shortly after the speech and quickly done with, but a 
project that by then had been in the attention of the German government constantly. Since 
Scheel and he had visited the White House, not a week had passed where the Year of Europe 
had not been treated,  and it was supported by German initiatives and proposals. Yet this was 
not just be a West German – United States affair, but all the EEC countries should be 
involved.13 It will become clear in this thesis that Brandt had a valid point and that the Year of 
Europe was taken seriously in West Germany.  
 When it concerns the Year of Europe much has been written, both during and shortly 
after the project, but also later in secondary literature. For example, The Strained Alliance has 
a number of essays that specifically deal with the Year of Europe and were written with the 
year itself as a subject, both in relation to Germany as to Europe, such as Asserting Europe’s 
Distinct Identity: The EC Nine and Kissinger’s Year of Europe, Kissinger’s Year of Europe, 
Britain’s Year of Choice and West Germany’s Long Year of Europe: Bonn between Europe 
and the United States.14 Especially the last chapter of these three about West Germany by 
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Fabian Hilfrich tells a lot about the German approach to the Year of Europe. He argues that 
West Germany played a key role in the power-struggle between the Western countries and for 
a great part decided the outcome of this struggle. Acting as a mediator between France and the 
United States, Bonn was willing to estrange themselves from Washington, so Europe had a 
greater chance to integrate in 1973. This made them a target for the scorn of both the United 
States and France.15 Daniel Möckli has written about the initiative in both the bundle above 
and in his own book. He summarized the project in European Foreign Policy During the Cold 
War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity and focused on the actions 
individual countries undertook. For Germany he described their attitudes toward the Year of 
Europe at the beginning of the project, taking Brandt’s visit to the White House as a focal 
point. Next to this Möckli focuses on France and Britain, and especially West Germany’s 
interactions with them. However, he is reluctant to concentrate on West German – American 
communications and puts the end of the Year of Europe in October 1973.16 The chapters by 
Möckli and Hilfrich and Möckli’s book are certainly valuable additions to understanding how 
the Year of Europe played out in West Germany. Yet their position is not the commonly 
accepted view of the Year of Europe. It also lacks a profound explanation of how the German 
officials took to the project. The PhD dissertation “The Year of Europe: 1973/74, A Study in 
Alliance Diplomacy” by Richard Moon is also a very valuable asset with regards to the Year 
of Europe, but regrettably concentrates mostly on the French and British opposition to the 
project. However, because of this it does open a window to the German handling of the 
drafting of a declaration, mostly as a counterpart to French opposition to involvement of the 
United States in Europe.17 Another work that focuses on the Year of Europe as a separate 
entity is Kissinger’s autobiographical work Years of Upheaval, where a part of the book is 
dedicated to the initiative and what happened during this year, as experienced by Kissinger. In 
this chapter Kissinger described how he worked with the various European parties, explaining 
the diplomatic process and the difficulties that came with the Year of Europe project.18 A New 
Challenge for Western Europe by Walther Kiep elaborates on the relations between Germany 
and the United States during the Nixon administrations and the Year of Europe, but this is one 
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of the only German autobiographical ones that does so.19 Most works that have been written 
about these years focus on the Nixon years, 1969 – 1973, and touch upon the Year of Europe 
in a couple of pages, or a chapter at most. Prime examples are A Tangled Web by Ted Bundy, 
The Unhinged Alliance by John Robert Schaetzel and The Flawed Architect by Jussi 
Hanhimäki. 20  While they are great books on American foreign policy and transatlantic 
relations, they only dedicate a few words to the Year of Europe, often regarding Europe as a 
single region, without considering the regional and mutual relations the European countries 
had. This makes them of less use for the main arguments of this thesis, but they do provide a 
copious amount of background information regarding the events that also developed in 1973. 
Overall the Year of Europe in West Germany received recognition, but not everything 
concerning the relation between West Germany and the United States in this year has been 
researched and explained yet. Because of this, there is no consensus on what effect it had on 
West Germany and its relations with the United States. Though many works have been 
written, they generally concern literature written from an American point of view. West 
German secondary sources are rare, yet Kiep’s work and the chapters in The Strained Alliance 
provide some insight into the German perception of the Year of Europe and West German – 
American relations. To summarize, the commonly accepted view is that the Year of Europe in 
general did not meet the expected results and did not have a lot of influence on foreign policy 
decisions and the West German side is mostly neglected, even by German writers. However, 
the objective of this thesis is not to refute the already existing theories concerning the Year of 
Europe or to devaluate the research scholars have done before. The goal is to contribute to an 
understanding of West Germany’s role during the year, to adjust the opinion that prevails 
concerning West Germany and its relations with the United States. 
 The research done in this thesis is based on three types of sources. The first are those 
of the German Foreign Ministry’s archives, based in Berlin, and the documents of the Office 
of the Historian during the Nixon-Ford administrations. This concerns documents that were 
written during the Year of Europe and subsequently published and made available in the 
archives. These documents uncover a solid idea of how German politicians approached and 
acted in relation to Kissinger’s initiative. The archive of the German Foreign Ministry, das 
Politische Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, has ample documents regarding West German foreign 
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policy, both with the United States and Europe. Written sources have been kept from 1973, 
including those that concern the Year of Europe, the new Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of 
Principles and the European identity. This ranges from interviews and conversations to letters 
and telegrams, from people and committees all through the government. Secondly, there are 
the sources from the American side, which are available online, such as telegrams and other 
correspondence with governments and embassies. Lastly autobiographical and other works 
published by people such as Kissinger and Brandt, to show the perspective of the people who 
participated in the Year of Europe. This thesis will also be grounded in secondary literature, 
which is necessary to explain the relations between the United States, West Germany, the 
European Economic Community and other parties in the Year of Europe, and to explain how 
the positions of the various actors came to be in 1973. Concerning the primary sources, it is 
important to distinguish documents that describe ‘regular’ foreign politics and documents that 
focus on the Year of Europe, the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration on Principles. The 
sources that have been used are those that presume that the subject is the Year of Europe and 
not sources describing ‘business as usual’. The involvement of West Germany in the Year of 
Europe can be seen in primary sources throughout the year. From April through March the 
following year, there were always letters and telegrams being sent, meetings summarized and 
interviews being given. From both the West German side and the American side various notes 
can be found as to how both sides viewed a certain meeting or visit. This is quite practical as 
it grants a more insightful view into the opinions of the two nations, both towards the project 
and each other. 
The general outline and topics this thesis will touch upon are the following: An 
introduction to American – German relations prior to 1973. Though the described period 
ranges from 1945 to 1972, the emphasis will lie on the last couple of years from 1969 to 1972, 
the Nixon/Brandt years. This will be continued with the Year of Europe, during which the 
focus is on the position of Germany in Europe and the European Economic Community and 
the American stance toward Europe. Furthermore, it will be examined how and if American – 
German relations changed during and because of the Year of Europe initiative. This will be 
finished with an explanation of how the Year of Europe fitted in American – German relations. 
At the end of this there will be a clear view of American – German relations from 1945 to 
1973, to clear up how Germany handled the Year of Europe with regard to the United States 
and Europe and how the Year of Europe fitted into American – German relations overall.  
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Chapter 1: From foes to friends? German-American relations from 1945 to 
1972. 
World War II had left Germany in ruins, but the settling of the conflict did not yield 
the same sort of consequences that World War I had. The Treaty of Versailles had brought 
with it, amongst others, enormous compensations from Germany, the ceding of territory such 
as the Alsace-Lorraine, which the Germans had claimed for their own, and the stab-in-the-
back legend, which contributed to Hitler’s rise to power.21 
Keeping this in mind, World War II was worked out quite differently, which started 
with the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1948. Whereas Germany was severely 
punished after World War I, leaving the Weimar Republic bankrupt and doomed to fail, this 
time there was an incentive to rebuild first, and let West Germany and other countries that 
received Marshall Aid repay their debts to the United States afterwards. Another goal of the 
United States was to bind Western Europe to themselves through the Marshall Plan and keep 
the Russians and communism at bay. 
The Marshall Plan led to a rapid rebuilding of West European industry, including West 
Germany, all of which profited greatly from the initiative. Even though the country and Berlin 
were officially divided into four zones of occupation, with the help of the Americans an 
independent West Germany was founded in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany. Aided 
by the United States it could rebuild its economy and start recruiting an army, the 
Bundeswehr, though this was only meant for self-defense. The support given by the United 
States was not only based on economic/monetary aid, but also on military assistance. Even 
after the Allied Control Council, a military governing body tasked with governing Germany 
after the Third Reich had fallen, stopped functioning, Allied troops remained within the 
German borders. Most of these were American troops.22 Though initially posted as a force to 
ensure the power changes in Germany would go according to plan, they later stayed to give 
assurance against the Warsaw Pact. This was combined with a nuclear guarantee from the 
United States against the Soviet Union. 
Economy-wise, the Marshall Plan contributed to the so called ‘Wirtschaftswunder’, 
the economic miracle that ensued in West Germany. Erhard, who was the Minister of 
Economics under the Adenauer administration, worked to implement the new currency, the 
Deutschmark, abolished rationing and fixed prices, and cut tax rates. This way, the German 
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free market was opened for the first time in years and it proved to be a huge success. From 
1948 to 1958 industrial production had increased fourfold and was three times as high per 
capita as it was before.23 
Konrad Adenauer played a huge role in the postwar years, working together with 
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. He was chancellor of Germany from 1949 to 
1963, oriented on Western Europe, an anti-communist, and he sought good relations with 
NATO and the United States to oppose East Germany and the Warsaw Pact.24 The United 
States were not only dealing with West Europe after World War II. Their relation with the 
Soviet Union and communism worsened rapidly. This led to an international position that the 
United States did not have nor wanted before, but they still saw communism as a threat to the 
international community to which they had to respond. Acting according to the Truman 
Doctrine, the United States initiated a policy of actively containing communism, starting with 
Greece and Turkey.  
 During the first years of the Cold War, the results to contain communism were also 
more important than the way in which they were reached. This made the United States willing 
to cooperate with social democrats in Europe.25 Officials from the United States were not 
especially keen to do this, but valued the goal of containing communism above working 
together with social democrats. Geir Lundestad asserts that Germany was a necessity in the 
NATO for the same reasons. 26 Though they were not included in the Treaty of Washington in 
1949, they joined in 1955.27 Having West Germany join them was necessary because the 
United States and NATO needed the German forces as a safeguard in Central Europe. Next to 
that, they could not have West Germany as an independent power in the middle of Europe, 
which could have made them vulnerable to Soviet intervention.28 In the middle of the 1950s 
the founding of NATO was a reinvigoration of the Atlantic community, designed to contain 
Western Europe from falling into the hands of communist Russia. The Atlantic community 
was de facto led by the United States, who supplied the Supreme Allied Commander for 
Europe and a great number of troops and materiel. 
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According to Lundestad, there were multiple reasons to integrate Germany into 
Europe. To the United States it was important to keep the democratic capitalist governments 
that already existed in Western Europe in that form and to prevent them from slipping into 
authoritarianism, or communism. They also wanted Europe to be more efficient, as to relieve 
their own burden concerning military expenses. This was of course in the best interests of the 
United States, because they could benefit from an efficient Europe that could take care of 
itself. Next to these economic interests they wanted to integrate Western Europe because the 
Soviet Union needed to be contained. Communism was not to be given a chance, certainly not 
in Western Europe. If Europe could fall for communism, the United States might be 
vulnerable too. Lastly, Germany needed to be contained. In the past, they had shown they 
were able to start international conflicts on such a scale, that they could only be stopped 
through intervention by a strong international coalition. That is why (West) Germany was not 
contained through punishment and sanctions, but by aid and rebuilding of the country.29 It 
was possible to achieve the aforementioned points not only because the United States wanted 
to implement this, but also because Adenauer and his government were very pro-American, 
up until the end of the 1950s. The goals pointed out by Lundestad are similar to the objectives 
that Kissinger would set in 1973, highly valuing cooperation as opposed to an adversary 
relationship. 
Despite the fact that the United States was one of the strongest nations in the world, 
certainly in the Western Hemisphere, they were not omnipotent. They still needed the 
assistance and cooperation of other countries to execute their agenda.30 Part of this can be 
attributed to the ideological way in which the United States wanted to propagate and execute 
their targets. Contrary to the authoritarian Soviet Union and China, they adhered to an 
ideology in which free choice was of the utmost importance, though the choices other nations 
made were preferably to their advantage.31 To make these decisions they were dependent on 
Konrad Adenauer. Though West Germany was experiencing an economic resurgence, they 
were not on par with the international superpowers, neither economically nor militarily. This 
did not make Adenauer the lap dog of the United States, because they were not able to force 
their policies upon him and West Germany, and he acted according to a role that was to be 
expected in a junior-senior relationship. The loss of the cooperation with this pro-American 
chancellor could have led to a Germany that sought to connect with Russia, the resurgence of 
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a nationalistic Germany, or the loss of a good military association with West Germany. These 
were not scenarios that the United States wanted to happen.32 
 Schröder and Larres offer a German perspective on this subject. From their chapters 
concerning the Adenauer years can be distilled that the mood was pro-American until 1958, 
with Adenauer even being called ‘Kanzler der Amerikaner’, chancellor of the Americans.33 
They also asserted that the United States wanted to rebuild the power of Germany, to build a 
third power next to Russia and themselves. Klaus Larres argues that the United States did not 
originally intend to bring West Germany under their sphere of influence, as long as they were 
not communist, because the United States was unable to exert this much influence on another 
country, nor implement a self-regulating system in Europe.34 And while the United States 
called for a stronger military in Europe, European weakness and a fear of communism made 
the United States take matters into its own hands and keep enough troops stationed in Europe. 
Though West Germany was in a relatively good position and could influence the United 
States, Konrad Adenauer was experienced enough to know not to overplay his hand: “Der 
Kanzler war sich bewußt, daß Westdeutschland nur gemeinsam mit den Alliierten, 
insbesondere den USA, und nicht in Opposition zu ihnen, allmählich wieder die Souveränität, 
die Gleichberechtigung und internationales Vertrauen gewinnen konnte.” This “Bündnis des 
Vertrauens”, a bond of trust, was employed by Adenauer in his years of dealing with 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles. Together they sought to integrate 
Germany into Europe again and while the United States was the senior partner, they weren’t 
able to coerce Bonn into doing their bidding. This trust in Adenauer remained, even after he 
set up diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1955. Regardless, Adenauer did not take 
too kindly to the Soviet Union, as they recognized East Germany. The visit to Moscow then 
also led to the creation of the Hallstein doctrine, under which West Germany did not 
recognize East Germany, next to their goal of reunification.35  
The relation between West Germany and the United States countries only changed 
after 1958, with the second Berlin Crisis and Adenauer taking on a more Gaullist stance, 
oriented on Europe and a good Franco-German relationship. Adenauer sought to do this 
because he started to look for an alternative to American hegemony. This was reinforced by 
the Berlin Crisis of 1958 – 1961, which started with an ultimatum by Khrushchev, who 
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demanded the retreat of allied troops from West Berlin. Though Eisenhower and Kennedy 
tried to discuss the issues with Khrushchev, they were not successful. The crisis eventually 
led to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and a standoff with tanks in Berlin. This last 
event only barely evaded escalation and luckily did not lead to a bigger conflict.36 Aside from 
this, Adenauer developed a strong bond of trust with Charles de Gaulle, who was President of 
France from 1959 to 1969, developed in these years.37 De Gaulle executed a policy called 
Gaullism. He wanted a strong French state in the middle of Europe and combined this with a 
mistrust of the power that the United States wielded. It was a kind of nationalism revised for 
the late twentieth century, as it also incorporated strong bonds with other countries such as 
West Germany.38 This pull to France and Europe led to a depression in the relation with the 
United States, because West Germany was now making decisions on its own, instead of 
strictly following the policies that the United States wanted. As already explained by 
Lundestad, the United States were quite wary of this, because they wanted to keep Germany 
in check. A Germany that was not dependent on the United States could spell trouble not only 
for them, but for the international community. 
Under Erhard, Adenauer’s successor, the relation between West Germany and the 
United States recovered. Erhard was also a member of Adenauer’s CDU/CSU and was able to 
quickly reshape the bond with Johnson, both of whom came to office at almost the same time. 
Already in the Autumn of 1963 the two men met in the United States and decided to continue 
the American – West German dialogue. After Erhard came Kiesinger, who also tried to 
continue a professional relationship with the United States. The chancellors did not deviate 
from the Hallstein doctrine, nor did they execute other policies that radically changed West 
German foreign affairs. However, there were the necessary disturbances and frictions during 
these years, which can be attributed to the Vietnam war, which became an increasingly 
sensitive issue for the Bonn government and Adenauer, who became more anti-American 
after his chancellorship. However, though this put pressure on the relationship, it was far from 
a crisis or a break between the two countries.39 
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1969 up to 1973, the first Brandt and Nixon governments 
 The years leading up to and including the Year of Europe can be singled out, because 
Germany and the United States were both led by one president or chancellor, who both had 
their own particular ideas regarding foreign policy, which differed from the governments that 
preceded them. In the United States Richard Nixon was inaugurated and several months later 
Germany followed, where Willy Brandt became chancellor after the Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands (SPD) got the most votes in Germany. These men were not closely 
related through politics and Nixon disliked the leftist German chancellor.40  
 The struggles between both countries stemmed mostly from their respective positions 
towards the communist bloc, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China. While both were 
starting to conduct policies that were designed to cool down the Cold War, they disagreed on 
the implementation and details. The United States had been working on détente since the 
middle of the 1960s. Détente was the American strategy that was designed to relax tensions in 
the Cold War. Though early signs of it can be seen in the Johnson years, it was put into action 
under the Nixon administration in 1969, who sought improved relations with the communist 
countries.41 It was a strategy that was not specifically designed to roll back communism, but it 
was used to drive a wedge between the communist bloc, explicitly between the Soviet Union 
and China.42 By doing this, the United States stood to gain more influence in the countries, 
lessen the risk of starting a conflict, and open the way to a more peaceful relationship, 
including better trade relations. These were also the biggest differences from the rollback and 
containment policies the United States had executed from the end of World War II until now. 
Under rollback they had tried to actively drive communism back as far as possible. Though 
his had been given up when they implemented containment, which had meant that they would 
not allow communism to spread further, they still held a hostile relationship with the 
communist countries, barely communicating or trading with them.43  
In 1969 the Brandt government started implementing Ostpolitik, which was also 
intended to start working on better relations with the German Democratic Republic and the 
Soviet Union. Ostpolitik was the form of foreign policy that had been designed by Egon Bahr, 
the Federal Minister for Special Affairs of Germany in Brandt’s cabinet. While only 
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implemented once Brandt and Bahr were seated in the Chancellery, Ostpolitik could be seen 
as long coming. In the early 1960s, when Brandt was Mayor of Berlin, Bahr was the head of 
the Press and Information Office for the region. Both men witnessed the raising of the Berlin 
Wall and the lack of a response from any of the parties involved in the city to stop this. It was 
also during Brandt’s years as chancellor that the German Democratic Republic was 
acknowledged by the Federal Republic and its allies for the first time.44 A foreign policy was 
designed that led to a repeal of the Hallstein Doctrine, under which West Germany did not 
recognize their Eastern counterpart. The CDU/CSU, the Christian Democratic coalition of 
Konrad Adenauer,45 that had governed from 1948 to 1966, and from 1967 to 1969 in a ‘Grand 
Coalition’ with the SPD, had always refrained from doing so. Brandt and Bahr tried to 
normalize the relation and to bring the two countries together, as they had the opinion that this 
was the only way to change something, instead of the impasse that had been omnipresent 
during the CDU/CSU years.46 
 Egon Bahr had developed a strategy of ‘Wandel durch Annäherung’, change through 
rapprochement. The goals of this new Ostpolitik were to stabilize the relations with the 
Kremlin, the Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union’s other allies in Eastern Europe. But 
Ostpolitik also had a very important western part. Because Bonn feared that the Soviets could 
immediately take advantage of any discrepancies between Ostpolitik and the Atlantic idea of 
détente, practicing Westpolitik with the Atlantic allies remained fundamental. Through its 
nature of being an idea that invoked change, it held the promise of greatly reducing the 
tensions that had existed for twenty years, but also to cause a great deal of upheaval in the 
middle of Europe.47 
 Ostpolitik had a place in the already existing ideology of détente, and was made 
possible because of it. Hans Arnold, a German diplomat for Brandt’s government, explained it 
as follows: since the United States and the Soviet Union, the “Superpowers”, had already 
entered a state of relaxation, only then could the West Germans implement Ostpolitik, without 
fear of some kind of retaliation from either the Russians or the Americans. 48  Whereas 
Ostpolitik could be seen as a regional strategy, détente was between all the Cold War rivals. It 
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was designed to ease tensions between the parties, but not to secure an end to the Cold War. 
One of the major differences was that this policy was led by the United States. This resulted 
in friction between the two allies. While both sought to improve the relations with the East, 
there were crucial differences and details that need to be understood. On a personal level, 
Brandt and Bahr were not liked by Nixon and Kissinger. Kissinger was mistrustful of Bahr, 
mostly because he thought Bahr was a German nationalist who did not want to seek the best 
position for the Atlantic Alliance or the United States, but only for Germany, by negotiating 
with both sides and coming out with the best deal for himself. According to Kissinger, Bahr 
was not as dedicated to Western unity as the government that came before. In private 
conversations he even called Bahr a ‘reptile’ and a ‘little bastard’.49  Regardless of these 
personal issues, in 1969 Kissinger had already set up a “backchannel” with Bahr, a secretive 
communications channel, always wanting to know what happened in Bonn, just as he had 
with other allies.50 Nixon had other personal concerns however, fearing that Brandt stole his 
role as the icon of détente, even going so far as to disagree with the State Department’s 
support of Ostpolitik because of a grudge.51 
 Aside from these very personal feuds, there were other issues that played during the 
Nixon/Brandt administrations. The White House was very wary when Ostpolitik was 
announced.52 Détente was designed to relax tensions and bring the Cold War to a standstill, 
but it was not a final resolution. Despite détente there was still a rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.53 Ostpolitik was designed on the basis of rapprochement. This 
startled the United States, because though they were seeking better connections, they were not 
willing to simply ‘make friends’ with the Soviet Union, nor to let West Germany walk into 
the arms of the Russians. But if and when this process would be started, the United States all 
but demanded to be the ones who would lead it. Kissinger and Nixon were not keen on West 
Germany taking the lead in negotiations with the communist world. They wanted to have 
these communications take place in the framework of a United States – Soviet Union – China 
triangle. This did not leave a lot of space for other, smaller, parties to interfere and to work 
with the biggest actors on the international stage.54 The White House also was not fond of the 
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fact that West Germany took a differing role from détente. Kissinger wanted it to be an 
undivided strategy and in particular one where the United States took the absolute lead in 
deciding the tone and pace. This was of course combined with the unrelenting fear that West 
Germany could drift off into the hands of the Soviet Union if they were not careful.55  
Though the strategies showed similarities, they were quite discernable. As discussed 
before, there were differences concerning the scale of the policies, regional Ostpolitik versus 
global détente, the fact that détente was more set on easing tensions, instead of really 
resolving differences, and the determination of the United States that they should be in charge 
of a global détente, to which Ostpolitik should be subordinate. Apart from these differences 
was the way in which the goals of détente and Ostpolitik should be attained. Bonn wanted to 
challenge the status quo, the uneasy standstill that had existed for years, and after that to 
confer with the Soviet Union, of whom they thought were ready to compromise and cooperate. 
The United States feared this and wanted to maintain the status quo, fearing that this might set 
off events that they could not fully control and thus not regulate the speed of the process.56 
The incompatibilities between the two strategies caused friction between the United States 
and Germany.57 
 However, apart from Nixon and Kissinger’s issues with Ostpolitik, it was actually well 
received at the State Department. The State Department saw Ostpolitik as a valuable addition 
to détente. They too were cautious, but not as personally involved as Nixon and Kissinger. As 
Ray S. Cline wrote: “If our best efforts should fail, and the FRG should move nevertheless 
towards limited security concessions or an even more costly bargain with the Soviets, we 
would have no alternative but to acquiesce. However, we should participate to the extent 
possible in any negotiations with the Soviets to obtain maximum advantage for the FRG and 
the West.”58   
The Bonn government picked up the negative ambiance that Nixon and Kissinger 
brought with them. Because of this, Horst Ehmke, a minister in Brandt’s government, was 
sent to Washington to discuss the United States’ point of view. When he was at the White 
House, Kissinger said that while there were ‘minor points of difference’, there were ‘no major 
quarrels’ with regard to Ostpolitik. Though not a blatant lie, it certainly was not Kissinger’s 
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own opinion, who is also known to have said to a West German official: “If there is to be a 
policy of détente, then we will do it and not you.”59  
However, numerous significant diplomatic goals were achieved through Ostpolitik. 
The most important and tangible were the Treaty of Moscow, the Treaty of Warsaw, the Four 
Power Agreement on Berlin and the Basic Treaty. The Treaty of Moscow resulted in a 
compact document aimed to create a formal peacekeeping system and relations based on the 
principles as stated in the United Nations Charter. The treaty also accounted for the 
recognition of European borders as they were in 1970.60 The Treaty of Warsaw was set up in 
the same spirit, but featured an introduction that stressed the fact that World War II had been 
over for 25 years and that now, a durable relation between West Germany and Poland had to 
be established, in the best interest of a new generation that had not known war. Just like the 
treaty of Moscow it was an agreement to maintain peaceful relationships, but even more 
important for Poland, it also approved the Oder-Neisse line as the official border between 
Germany and Poland.61 At the same day as signing the treaty in Warsaw, Brandt visited and 
knelt at the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, further showing humility and 
willingness to seek closer relations with Eastern Europe.62 With regards to German oriented 
issues, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin and the Basic Treaty were even more important. 
Though the Four Power Agreement was not an official treaty, it was an important document 
that reaffirmed the division of Berlin and the existing borders and barriers.63  The Basic 
Treaty, drafted a year later, used this reaffirmation to let the two German states formally 
recognize each other, letting go of the Hallstein doctrine that had been in place for years.64 
Considering that the Brandt administration struck four very important deals in four years, 
including these first steps toward reconciliation with the German Democratic Republic, it can 
be said that Ostpolitik was promising to be a success. 
A number of things should be taken into considering while discussing Ostpolitik and 
détente. While West Germany was opening to the East, they were also organizing in the West, 
being part of the growing EEC. Though Ostpolitik played a major role in German foreign 
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policy, they were also busy integrating into the rest of Western Europe. 65 Yet while Ostpolitik 
was crucial for West Germany, to the United States West Germany was only a minor player in 
their global foreign policy strategy.66 Nonetheless, after his inauguration in 1969, Nixon said 
he had plans to revitalize NATO, but he was not able to deliver on this promise.67 From the 
start of the administration through 1972, they were mostly dealing with Vietnam, China and 
Russia, hoping to end the war and seek closer relations with the communist countries, 
favoring détente over Europe and West German Ostpolitik.68 
To summarize: during the almost thirty years after World War II the relations between 
the United States and West Germany went through various phases. These were the tenures of 
the pro-American Adenauer, who later switched to a more Gaullist and Europe centered 
stance. After fourteen years as chancellor Adenauer was succeeded by Erhard and then 
Kiesinger, who both aimed to uphold a good connection with the United States, but of which 
certainly the latter was troubled by the United States’ involvement in Vietnam. Lastly there 
was Brandt’s government, which had an international focus and tried to maintain a good 
relationship with the United States, but which did not succeed, partially because of personal 
struggles between the president and chancellor. The relationship was never hostile, but did 
change based on the priority both countries gave one another. Easy examples are the boom in 
the 1950s, which was quite contrary to the late 1960s when the focus of the United States was 
with Vietnam, the Soviet Union and communist China instead of West Europe, let alone West 
Germany. In 1972 and 1973 the problems of the United States got worse, because Nixon was 
unable to perform a number of his duties due to the unraveling of the Watergate scandal. At 
the same time, West Germany was busy normalizing their relations with the East German 
state and setting up the European Community. Even seen apart from the transatlantic 
community in general, it is obvious that the relation between the two countries was not at a 
peak.  
On a purely political level it was also caused by two apparently similar approaches to 
dealing with communist countries. The United States acted out détente and West Germany 
under Brandt had employed Ostpolitik. Both theories were based on the improvement of 
bonds with other countries. This occurred with the communist countries. The usually smooth 
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connection between the two countries had hit a bump in the road, not only because of 
professional differing opinions on foreign policy, but also due to personal issues between their 
top officials.  
Chapter 2: The Year of Europe in Germany 
As explained in the previous chapter, German-American relations had its ups and 
downs during the almost thirty years since the end of World War II. The same was true for 
European-American relations, though this had been complicated due to the European nations 
moving through a multitude of organizations and did not generally speak or act as a single 
entity. At the same time, Western Europe did not have the Nixon administration its attention. 
This had resulted in a severe degradation of the relation between the two parties. At the same 
time, Kissinger and Nixon had been working to restore the bonds with two of their sworn 
rivals, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the two biggest communist 
nations. They were also trying to put an end to the Vietnam conflict, which is very clear in 
Kissinger’s biographies and memoires, but of course also in the corpus of material that has 
been written about it during the past fifty years.69 This chapter will first provide an overview 
of the Year of Europe and then provide an analysis under the heading ‘Breakdown of the 
project’. 
April through September 
On April 23, 1973 Kissinger gave a speech during a meeting with the Associated Press 
at the Waldorf-Astoria hotel in New York. He started by declaring that this year was not 
supposed to be the Year of Europe, because Europe had been less important in the previous 
years and that an important alliance between the United States and Europe had existed since 
the end of the war. However, that alliance was weakening because of various reasons. Europe 
had had a revival and was unifying economically. The strategic military balance had shifted 
from American power to near equality, so international security had to be rethought. Neither 
the speech nor Kissinger’s memoirs make it clear what he meant exactly. Japan had to be part 
of the new alliance and the term “Atlantic” had to be expanded as to include them in the 
community. Kissinger did not explain this in the speech, only in his memoirs. Japan had 
become an important region and for “Atlantic” solutions to be viable it had to be included.70 
Due to détente, an opportunity was created for new sorts of nationalism to rise internationally. 
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This, in combination with a multitude of other issues that had not been foreseen a generation 
ago, had given Kissinger an impulse to start the Year of Europe. He foresaw a challenge for 
the Atlantic Community that had to be faced together and in cooperation, so that the Atlantic 
alliance would not be destroyed. For this to be achieved President Nixon himself would be 
involved in the project, with Kissinger all but promising a trip of Nixon to Europe in 1973. 
This was bound to the condition that toward the end of the year, a new Atlantic Charter had to 
have been designed. The new Atlantic Charter should be a blueprint for the Atlantic 
Community that: “Builds on the past without becoming its prisoner. Deals with the problems 
our success had created. Creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship is whose progress 
Japan can share. We ask our friends in Europe, Canada and ultimately Japan to join us in this 
effort. This is what we mean by the Year of Europe.” 
Kissinger proceeded to elaborate on the issues he saw in the Atlantic alliance, pointing 
out economic relations with the European Community, collective defense, in which the 
European nations and the United States were organized in NATO, and diplomacy, which did 
not usually happen multilaterally, but bilaterally. Economically the European nations had a 
regional character, while the United States had to act on a larger international scale and in a 
bigger monetary system. Diplomatically the European nations were also functioning as 
traditional nation states, working on a regional scale. This did not overlap with the United 
States, but was not immediately a cause for problems. What Kissinger emphasized was that 
the European nations in all their affairs had regional interests and the United States had global 
interests. If the Atlantic nations were to be more united these problems had to be confronted.71 
He wanted to do this by having the European nations draw up the aforementioned new 
Atlantic Charter. Just like the original Atlantic Charter this new initiative did not have goals 
that were set in stone, but were only outlines for what the United States wanted to achieve 
together with its European allies. The nations were supposed to work together, moving jointly 
instead of by themselves or by only communicating with the United States regarding the Year 
of Europe. European cooperation had the possibility to seriously alleviate Kissinger’s job, if 
he only had to work with one diplomat (or a specific group) that was able to speak and debate 
for the various European nations. Next to making it easier for Kissinger or other diplomats to 
debate with Europe, this would have made Europe more effective in international politics. 
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However, just like with Ostpolitik and détente, Kissinger did not like other actors having too 
much influence or disturbing his plans. 
The speech came quite unexpected and contrary to regular texts only a couple of 
countries had received the speech beforehand. West Germany was not one of these 
countries.72 Almost immediately a reaction was asked from them, but they did not know yet 
how to exactly formulate their answers.73 This also had to do with the fact that an official visit 
by Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel had already been planned for the first week of May, just a 
week after Kissinger’s speech. In another conversation between Brandt and Hillenbrand, the 
American ambassador in Bonn, Brandt was quite critical about the project and worried about 
the time provided to draft a new declaration. Hillenbrand responded by reminding Brandt that 
the United States did not want to wait ten years again for a result, as had happened with 
Kennedy’s proposal for an Atlantic partnership.74 The chancellor was critical, but believed the 
United States and West Germany still had the same goals, in forming a strong connection in 
which they could trust one another. On the evening of that day, April 26, Berndt von Staden, 
the West German ambassador in Washington, sent a letter to Bonn outlining the speech and 
interpretation thereof by the German embassy. According to von Staden the American 
officials were not able to explain the speech, so the Germans made their own first draft 
analysis for the government in Bonn. In a summary and analysis, von Staden clarified what 
the German embassy thought Kissinger meant with the speech and how this related to West 
Germany. 
The ambassador was critical about the speech, remarking that it gave more questions 
than answers. The main goal was to improve the relations between the US and Europe, though 
Europe had to fill in how to engage in this project. Next to this von Staden mentioned a 
couple of things specifically, apart from the general summary. He spotted rhetoric in 
Kissinger’s speech, especially contradictions regarding the progress and expectations the 
United States, a nostalgic longing to the decades from 1950 to 1970, when the United States 
was the hegemon of the Western world. Von Staden was positive about the initiative, not 
willing to go against the United States, but nonetheless he was confused and surprised by 
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Kissinger’s speech.75 On the other hand, the United States sent a telegram to its European 
embassies, explaining that the gist of the speech was to be that the United States wanted to 
write a new Atlantic Charter in 1973 with its European allies. It was supposed to be a joint 
effort outlining a set of objectives and principles to help guide them in the future, that ideally 
would be written before the president visited Europe.76 Because it was such a speech that was 
open for interpretation, it is logical that West Germany did not know how to position itself. 
Kissinger had given a speech in which Japan was dragged into the Atlantic Community and in 
which he asserted a certain military equality without explaining why he thought this. This 
caused the need for a telegram from the United States to clarify the speech. 
In the following days, Brandt was interviewed in anticipation to his visit to the White 
House. During this interview, he elaborated on the German-American relations in general, the 
East – West issues and the West German Ostpolitik, but when the new Atlantic Charter came 
into question he tried to evade the subject. Questions on the Charter and Kissinger’s speech 
were withheld an answer as Brandt did not yet seem able to answer them. Reiterating this 
stance, Brandt wrote in the New York Times that the United States should already regard 
Europe as a single partner and urged for a better cooperation between the two fronts, 
proposing a multilateral summit on top of the bilateral summits that already existed. Any 
mention of the Atlantic Charter and the Year of Europe however were omitted.77  
When Brandt and Scheel visited the United States in May, it became clear that Nixon 
did not want to be associated too much with the Year of Europe. Nixon already had other 
matters to deal with, with Watergate being the main issue. He also stated that the Year of 
Europe should not be the only way to improve relations, but should be one of the many ties 
between the United States and Europe. The visit did yield one valuable document: a draft of a 
Common German-American Declaration.78 This declaration was meant to establish a new 
official platform to improve the relations between the two countries. The president, chancellor, 
and both foreign ministers intended to sign an agreement to support each other with regards to 
foreign policy, defense politics and East-West relations, but also opened the way to discussing 
a new declaration as they opposed the concept of Atlantic Charter. However, there is no 
evidence that it has been signed and put into effect. After the conversations with Kissinger 
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and Nixon, Brandt sent two letters to Prime Minister Heath of Great Britain and to President 
Pompidou of France. These were letters explaining the meetings Brandt had had. He urged 
both statesmen to meet with Nixon individually and to steer unto a ‘constructive dialogue’ 
with Europe, as Brandt did not want to disturb the relation with the United States. He also 
stated to both heads of state that West Germany could not work with the term Atlantic Charter. 
While the exchange of letters between heads of state was very normal, it is telling that these 
letters so explicitly state the importance of better relations between European countries and 
the United States. France did not take too kindly to Brandt’s suggestions and ruled out the 
option of a multilateral summit as Brandt had suggested in the New York Times. In his 
statement France saw an involvement of the United States in Europe that they did not want.79 
After this visit, other German officials started to get involved with the project. Even 
though the material shows that the Year of Europe was not a real priority, enough has been 
written about it to show that it was not ignored in West Germany. Walter Scheel and the 
Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Alec Douglas-Home, discussed the speech and the 
Atlantic Charter, what was correct and what was false in Kissinger’s speech and how it should 
be approached.80 Brandt and Heath had a similar conversation, with Brandt assuming that 
Nixon did not fully support the plan proposed by Kissinger. However, both were prepared to 
work on a declaration, stating that it was more important to clarify the relations between the 
European Community and the United States, than to focus on the problems that existed 
between the United States and NATO.81 A few weeks later there was a conference of German 
and American officials, one of which was the official spokesman of the German government, 
Rüdger von Wechmar. He gave an overview of German foreign policy, amongst other things 
the speech of Kissinger and the importance of Nixon’s visit, which would be favorable 
concerning German-American relations. Von Wechmar stated quite clearly that West 
Germany treasured the German-American dialogue and that instead of a Year of Europe, a 
“Decade of Europe” would be needed.82 This last part might be a bit overenthusiastic, but the 
meeting once again made it clear that the West Germans deeply valued the relationship and 
                                                          
79
 Willy Brandt, “The Old World, the New Strength”, New York Times, April 29, 1973; Moon, “The Year of 
Europe: 1973/74, A Study in Alliance Diplomacy”, 88 – 89. 
80
 “Gespräch des Bundesaußenministers mit dem britischen Außenminister Douglas-Home am 16.5.1973 in 
Bonn.” Auswärtiges Amt 4, Betreff: 1) Integrationspolitik, Wirtschaftsentwicklung der EG, Band I vom 1. 1. 
1973 bis 31. 3. 1974. Politisches Archiv, Zwischenarchiv 105664, Geschäftszeigen der abgegebenen Registratur, 
410, 423, 00. 
81
 Gespräch des Bundeskanzler Brandt mit Premierminister Heath, May 29, 1973, AAPD 1973, doc. 164. 
82
 “Protokoll der Deutsch-Amerikanischen Informationsgespräche vom 30. Mai bis 31. Mai 1973 in San 
Clemente und Laguna Beach, Kalifornien, U.S.A.”, Auswärtiges Amt, Betreff: USA, Band 8, vom 1971 bis 1974, 
Politisches Archiv, Zwischenarchiv 101374, Geschäftszeigen der abgegebenen Registratur, 204, 321.00, USA.  
25 
 
did not want to see it deteriorate. However, this meeting was before there was mention of a 
declaration and refers to the position that West Germany wanted to keep nonetheless. 
A small but significant change in presentation was also made in June when Kissinger 
started to refer to the new Atlantic Charter as a Declaration of Principles. This had been a 
specific request of West Germany since Kissinger had given his speech. Germany had not 
been a part of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 as they were the enemy of the Allies, making up 
the most important part of the Axis powers in World War II. This change would not have 
happened if there had been no complaint or lobby from the German side, as they were the 
only ones who opposed this term because of its connotation with World War II. However, 
Kissinger did not care much for superficialities and was not interested in the name of the 
document, but only found it necessary that a document should be drafted.83 Contrary to the 
West German engagement, France opposed the American Year of Europe and Brandt’s 
willingness to respond to it. They did not want a multilateral approach to it, nor to 
institutionalize the relations with the United States.84 
The speech was discussed by Brandt and Pompidou in June, as they picked it apart and 
conversed about an idea for the declaration. They argued about the importance of the 
European nations working together and that it was important that the nine European 
Community members spoke with one voice.85 As Brandt conversed with Pompidou, Scheel 
sat with Jobert, the French foreign minister. They too discussed the address, but focused more 
on the importance of security and defense, and how it could be improved through better 
relations, both within Europe and with the United States.86 These conversations explicitly 
state that shortly after the speech West Germany’s top officials, contrary to the French, were 
willing to start on the project initialized by Kissinger. This was made clear through direct 
conversations with the United States, in the conference between officials of both countries, 
but also through Europe, with letters being sent on behalf of the chancellor to other Heads of 
State, and meetings where Kissinger’s speech was discussed and foreign policy was decided 
upon. 
In July Brandt officially asked Scheel to represent West Germany in the negations on 
the declaration, seeing the need for a good negotiator that worked for a more united Europe, 
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but also for the relation with the United States.87 This was shortly after Scheel had met with 
Hillenbrand to confer about the German-American relations and the goals that were set. 
Political unity in Western Europa, solidifying the cooperation with the United States and 
Canada and setting up numerous East-West contacts. Scheel wanted to settle this in a 
document, but he was uncertain whether this should be done pragmatically or systematically 
and if there was enough time to do this before the (not yet planned) trip of Nixon to Europe.88 
Later that month Scheel went to Washington again to debate the Atlantic cooperation 
with Kissinger. Kissinger proposed that his speech might have been a mistake, that the tone 
had been incorrect, by appointing Europe a regional role and by putting economic pressure on 
the relations. But he did insist that it was important for both sides of the Atlantic that a 
document was drafted. For this meeting Scheel had already brought drafts for an Atlantic 
declaration, which was called Teil III (Gliederung und Inhalt der Atlantick-Erklärung).89 
Kissinger replied to the document by saying it was one of the most useful texts he had ever 
seen, as it was in line with what the United States had originally wanted for the declaration. 
According to him it could be transformed into a fully-fledged declaration in just two or three 
weeks. But it could not end up in the NATO-machinery for then it would be “discussed to 
death”. It was all still based on Nixon’s eventual visit to Europe however, which was the final 
goal of the Year of Europe in the document that Scheel proposed.90 In his memoirs, Kissinger 
confirmed that Scheel’s proposal was a good one and that it was the document that most 
corresponded with what the United States had initially suggested.91 
During this month there was a lot of correspondence about the Year of Europe 
between European officials too. This was for example due to Scheel’s work, who discussed 
with Douglas-Home how the British wanted to work with the European Commission, but also 
a letter from Ambassador von Hase in London, who had spoken with his British colleague 
Brimlow. Aside from discussing the project itself, they emphasized that it was ‘five minutes 
to twelve’, to make the Year of Europe a success. It had become an urgent matter to take the 
momentum that had been gained by Scheel’s visit to the White House and not let it end up as 
an endlessly dragged out project. The sights were set on the Copenhagen summit, where the 
possibility to make real progress existed. In the words of Walter Scheel “In Kopenhagen 
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konnte ein Schritt nach vorne getan werden”.92 Until the start of the summer recess of the 
German Bundestag, there was certainly no lack of evidence that West German officials were 
not influenced by Kissinger’s speech. As Brandt would go on to say in March 1974, it seemed 
that almost every week someone had been working on the initiative, whether it was the 
drafting of the working papers that had been presented to Kissinger and Nixon or meeting 
with other European statesmen.  
These were not low-level officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but 
ambassadors and the West German Minister of Foreign Affairs. Scheel was continuously 
involved in the project as the person primarily responsible for the project. The West German 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed this to Ambassador von Staden: “Unsererseits wird 
die Bedeutung einer atlantische Erklärung nicht unterschätzt. Außenminister Scheel hat sich 
persönlich im Neuner-Kreis in Kopenhagen energisch dafür verwendet. Wir sehen darin eine 
Möglichkeit, die amerikanische Präsenz in Europa stärker zu verwurzeln. Eine solche 
Erklärung würde daher nach unserer Ansicht gerade auch im Interesse Europas liegen.” The 
declaration was of such an importance that the highest German official on this subject 
personally defended the necessity of drafting one in front of his eight European colleagues.93 
One month later, Kissinger and Scheel decided that it was best to let the progress on 
the declaration go on through both the European Community and the NATO. Scheel 
explained this was because it was easier to assemble the heads of government to talk about 
defense policy in NATO and to discuss economic subjects and European-American relations 
without the heads of state being present.94 A plausible complementing theory is that the split 
came through insistence by France, who did not want this kind of linkage with NATO. 95 
Kissinger was no fan of this idea and found it absurd that the heads of state would not discuss 
anything apart from defense, and that they delegate this to their ministers. He nevertheless 
agreed to the plan.96 Scheel asserted that they would think about what would be the best way 
to further the declaration, but also that West Germany would continue to work on proposals as 
part of both the Nine and NATO. He stated that they did not want a weak reprise of previous 
texts or declarations, but one that was rich in content, repeating that better ties with the United 
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States were in the best interests of Europe. What was repeated was the question of when 
President Nixon was planning to visit Europe.97 Just as the Germans, so too the Americans 
were becoming impatient, but for a different reason. According to Secretary Frank they had 
made a mistake by starting the project without the Europeans being involved from the start, as 
he stated in a conversation with the British ambassador. Because of this they should wait for 
the Copenhagen conference, when a statement should be ready. Only if this went wrong it 
would be time to start worrying. At the same time, they argued that it had to be made clear to 
Jobert that the Copenhagen summit had to be a success and that the key to a successful year 
was not in Washington, but in Paris.98 The Year of Europe was not yet lost, but this did 
depend on the participation of the parties involved. The project was now three months 
underway and had not yet delivered anything to really work with yet. Though it did not make 
Kissinger very happy, no real damage was done to the relations with Europe yet, nor the 
relation with West Germany in particular. 
NATO announced that the declaration had to be split into two parts in August. One for 
NATO and one for the European Community, almost literally cutting it into two pieces. For 
the NATO declaration, only the first part was required. Included with the summary van Well 
had written was a draft for a NATO declaration, already split into two parts, “Political basis 
and goal of the alliance” and “Defense policy”. While it was not a very shocking or 
groundbreaking document according to Secretary Frank, it was the only one that would be 
able satisfy the Americans, because the Dutch draft was deemed unsuitable and the British 
design was too short and aimed too much at pleasing France, so it would not live up to the 
expectations of the United States. The document stated that the alliance that had been formed 
had to guarantee freedom, peace and cooperation between and for the countries involved. It 
also provided for more unity in the European Community and better communications between 
them and the United States. The part that discusses defense policy was an official 
reaffirmation of the NATO principles, that tried to maintain peace and prohibit nuclear 
warfare.99 West Germany tried to draft a declaration that would satisfy both the United States 
and the Community. This would prove to be a weak move and they eventually accepted the 
British proposal under pressure from France. 100  The West German minister of finance 
Schmidt evaluated the situation in an interview with the General-Anzeiger, a paper in Bonn, 
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by saying that though he thought that the United States had not started the Year of Europe 
correctly, he was even less pleased with the fact that the European Community had not yet 
been able to offer a response. Not wanting to point fingers, he nonetheless was upset by the 
attempt of one or multiple nations that tried to force their ‘favorite ideas of individual national 
foreign policy’ on the common foreign policy of the European Community.101 Amongst other 
he must have meant France, who were trying to impose their Euro-centric politics on the 
declaration. However, by not explicitly condemning France, West Germany did not change 
the problem as it already was. 
The declaration for the EEC was presented at the next European summit in 
Copenhagen, where European cooperation was discussed by the foreign ministers of the nine 
members of the EC. The main point of discussion was the visit of President Nixon, still 
expected in the autumn of 1973. The Nine felt they had met the prerequisites for a meeting 
and they also had a design for a political declaration. However, France steered the 
Copenhagen meeting in their own way. They pushed the proposal that the Nine would not 
support US changes to the declaration, only by consensus. In Copenhagen, they also made 
sure that the list of subjects that would be discussed, could only be communicated with the 
United States orally.102 Yet again, they tried to make sure that the Year of Europe would 
progress on their terms and not those of the United States. 
The draft on US-EEC relations, which contained economic and diplomatic issues and 
a draft on the European identity, which outlined the general position of Europe towards the 
United States, would be given to Kissinger and discussed by Andersen, the chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, on September 24.103 It would be followed by a discussion of the nine 
political directors with their American counterparts. 104  This potentially created an 
unprecedented situation in which Europe spoke through a single person instead of having to 
discuss everything with each country one by one. Regrettably for Kissinger, it did not unfold 
this way. Instead of having one interlocutor, he only got a presenter, who could state, but not 
discuss on behalf of the other European countries. 
According to Kissinger, as said during a meeting with the Dutch ambassador, the EEC 
Nine had a wrong approach concerning the Year of Europe. He stated that the project was not 
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designed to distract from the Watergate scandal, nor that the United States needed the 
declaration because of that. They just wanted to counter the erosion of NATO, restore 
friendships and consolidate the base of Congress regarding the relation with Europe, to 
prevent the retreat of American troops from Europe. Yet Kissinger started to be more and 
more reluctant regarding Nixon’s visit to Europe, demanding a full declaration in October as a 
prerequisite.105 This came shortly after an official message from the State Department, sent to 
the European embassies, emphasizing that the Year of Europe was still in progress, but that no 
detailed assessment of Nixon’s trip could be made yet.106 
Regardless of this news, Brandt and Scheel were still in the middle of the process of 
drafting a declaration. At the end of September they visited the United States again, meeting 
with the president and Kissinger, who had been promoted to Secretary of State. Both Brandt 
and Scheel emphasized the necessity of Nixon’s visit to Europe in conversations with their 
counterparts. During his meeting with the president, which Brandt started by stating that 
“since May, real steps have been made regarding the Atlantic dialogue”, Nixon seemed to be 
optimistic about the Year of Europe as it was going so far.107 Though seemingly enthusiastic, 
he did not reveal an intention of visiting Europe in the near future. 
October through December, the Yom Kippur War and NATO summit of 
December 
In October 1973, the Yom Kippur War started in the Middle East, followed by an 
energy crisis, fueled by the lack of oil from the OPEC nations. In the Yom Kippur War Israel 
was attacked by the Arab countries surrounding it. Though it was not assisted militarily by the 
United States, they did supply Israel with the necessary materiel to wage war. To do this, they 
flew supplies to Israel from bases located in Germany. In a conversation with Hillenbrand, ten 
days after the Yom Kippur War had started, Scheel condemned this airbridge to Israel. A hard 
shift in priority and a dip in the tone at which the two countries had communicated can be 
perceived. Where the talks beforehand had focused on peace in Europe and the transatlantic 
alliance, the discussions between the heads of state, foreign ministers and ambassadors 
currently had a different character.108 For the West Germans, it was of utmost importance that 
the conflict was resolved as quickly as possible. A conversation between Egon Bahr, Heath, 
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Douglas-Home and other officials from the British Foreign Office revealed that the European 
capacity to help ending the war was very limited. With no American officials in attendance, 
the ministers discussed the changing roles of their countries, the European continent, and the 
position the United States occupied since World War II. While Britain was a former global 
power, their strength had declined, and Europe altogether was weak militarily, though it had 
built a solid economy. Therefore, the Americans had to admit that Europe was not able to 
defend itself, so they had to help guard the Western World. Bahr concluded this part of the 
conversation with a remark that the United States could not permit itself to retreat from the 
alliance with Europe.109 Bahr tried to have the British affirm the European weakness, luring 
them into approving of a strong relationship with the United States instead of France’s 
European-centric worldview. This was difficult for Britain, who had only just entered the 
European Community and also tried to prove themselves as Europeans. They were stuck 
between deciding to side with the French, who followed a Euro-centrist line, or to work 
together with the United States, with whom they had had a ‘special relationship’ since World 
War II.110 The fact that Heath, contrary to other British officials, did not highly value this 
‘special relationship’ only complicated the situation.111 Britain did not choose between either 
side in 1973, which did not help in making the Year of Europe a success. 
The crisis in the Middle East was not picked up in foreign policy talks between West 
Germany and other parties immediately, as talks with Britain and France about the 
transatlantic dialogue continued as they had in the months before. This would be to no avail, 
the French primarily opposed the idea of working together with the United States and would 
not take a different stance, regardless of persuasion by their peers.112 While the near-East 
conflict was paramount during the Yom Kippur War, regular foreign policy was still 
discussed. Of course, this was not abnormal, as the conflict was fought outside of Europe, 
with no active involvement of European troops, and daily business continued. To Kissinger 
the Yom Kippur War and the Energy Crisis were of much more importance than what 
happened in Europe.113 
In November, the Yom Kippur War had come to an end through a ceasefire brokered 
by the United Nations, with a lot of help from Kissinger, who had shuttled between the 
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different parties to intermediate between the different contenders.114 The Energy Crisis also 
contributed to the friction between the various countries. They all tried to solve the crisis in 
their own way: France and the United Kingdom worked around it and struck bilateral deals 
with the Arab countries, West Germany wanted a central solution through the EEC and the 
United States wanted to work together with all oil-consuming countries. 115  For the 
Transatlantic discussion this was a significant month because of a new meeting in 
Copenhagen for European political cooperation. Declarations of the Nine with the US, 
Canada and Japan were discussed, which were presented as European declarations instead of 
declarations drafted up by separate countries.116 After months of bilateral and multilateral 
discussions between the European countries, it seemed like steps were made to remake the 
Atlantic alliance, between a more unified and organized Europe and the United States. It was 
decided that Denmark would present the co-designed, new, proposal to the Americans, so it 
could be discussed next to the NATO summit that was planned a week later. More 
importantly were the identity papers that had been drafted and were presented this month. 
These documents focused on the European identity as something separate from the United 
States – European relations, whereas this had been a part of the general debate beforehand.117 
France continued to obstruct the Atlantic coalition again in November. Pompidou made it 
clear in a conversation with Brandt, where he explained that France did not want to 
institutionalize the relation between the European Community and the United States. 
Formalizing the relations would have given the United States an opportunity to influence the 
relations and thus, Europe. Brandt tried to reason with Pompidou and explained that he and 
his government still wished to continue the project, seeing the added value of it.118 This was 
already a repetition of what Brandt had done just a week before, when he went in front of the 
European Parliament and stressed before his peers West Germany’s commitment to both a 
unified Europe and Europe’s relations with the United States.119 This can be seen as a breach 
between France and West Germany again. France had a lot of influence in the EEC too, 
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forcing West Germany to compromise. West Germany could not risk a real break with France 
or the other European nations, even when it concerned the alliance with the United States. 
The NATO summit in December was the last meeting of foreign ministers and other 
officials in 1973. Before the summit, Kissinger, Douglas-Home, Jobert and Scheel had a 
conversation in which Kissinger accused the Europeans, and Jobert and Douglas-Home in 
particular, of working together against the United States. A good cooperation was needed, to 
make sure no animosity developed in the relation. And while France and Britain gave priority 
to Europe above the United States, Germany still supported a strong bond with the US and 
some sort of document to formally constitute this. As Ambassador van Well remarked: “…daß 
es für die Bundesregierung von besonderer Bedeutung sei, während der Entwicklung auf eine 
Identität der Neun hin das gute Verhältnis mit den Vereinigten Staaten zu erhalten und zu 
stärken. In welch einer Art von Dokument dieses seinen Niederschlag fände, bleibe noch zu 
entscheiden. Wichtig sei auch, daß die Neun in ihrem Verhältnis zu den Vereinigten Staaten 
die Entwicklung im Atlantischen Bündnis berücksichtigten. Der Öffentlichkeit müsse der 
Fortschritt der Beziehungen zwischen den Neun und den Vereinigten Staaten deutlich zu 
Kenntnis gebracht werden.”120 But this defense of the Year of Europe had been too little, too 
late. In a meeting just days later, the three positions that Kissinger had taken during the 
NATO meetings were discussed by van Well and Hillenbrand, as explained next. The 
Secretary of State had given quite mixed signals: when having dinner on December 10 with 
Jobert, Scheel and Douglas-Home he had said that the United States was not interested in a 
declaration of the Nine anymore and that the present version was not sufficient. The day after 
he told assembled officials at the NATO summit that both versions, the one of the EEC and 
NATO, should be developed later. The nine ministers of the EEC were told that the 
declaration had to be completely redone. It was now too long, too legalistic, should be more 
politically oriented and more inclusive instead of divisive. Regardless of this setback the West 
Germans still wanted to proceed with the plan, according to the summary that was written of 
this conversation. 121  However, the various documents that should be drafted were now 
diffused into half-products that did not bear much resemblance to the new Atlantic charter 
that Kissinger had originally proposed, just eight months earlier. 1973 thus ended without a 
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declaration and with relations between the various European nations and the United States in 
a recession.  
The last canto. January through March 1974. 
The first months of 1974 showed a reduced interest in the project. Compared to 1973, 
far fewer documents were dedicated to the Year of Europe. In January, February and March 
Kissinger and Scheel corresponded about the project. According to Scheel, work was still 
being done on the West German declaration, but it had now become exactly what Kissinger 
had hoped to prevent, an endlessly dragged out project, with no clear end in sight. Something 
that should have taken just a couple of months was still in progress, almost a year later.122 The 
American Ambassador Bruce remarked that from an American point of view, the relations 
with Europe and West Germany had become worse due to the Year of Europe.123 Scheel 
nonetheless tried to propose a declaration, that could be discussed in March and signed in 
April, when Nixon should have come to visit.124 Scheel’s attitude was also propagated by the 
SPD’s spokesman, Grünewald. While the failure of the project was already evident, he told 
the Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung that Bonn did not consider 1973 a failure concerning 
American-European relations and hoped that 1974 would bring it to a fitting conclusion.125 
However, there was opposition to the Year of Europe and the way the Brandt 
government handled it in West Germany too. At the Bundestag meeting of March 28, the 
opposition parties strongly attacked Kissinger’s speech of the year before and the American 
initiative, which they saw, like the French, as a way of the United States to gain more 
influence. According to the CDU/CSU opposition the relations with the United States were 
now at its worst since World War II. Both Scheel and Brandt got time to respond. Scheel 
defended the project and pointed out that it was important that the cohesion between Europe 
and the United States was retained. Brandt was even more passionate in his defense, claiming 
that the government had and continued to work on better relations with the United States and 
Europe and that the project had been a mainstay of the government since its announcement in 
April.126 
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The defense of the project by Brandt and Scheel had already been in vain. A striking 
end to the Year of Europe, that embodied the frustration Kissinger had had with the project, 
was the telegram he sent on March 27, 1974, almost a year after his original speech. In this he 
wrote: “I have noted press statements to the effect that we are no longer interested in the Year 
of Europe declarations.”127 The frustration was not strange, because while the West Germans 
were still maintaining the project, Jobert was thwarting renewed consultations with the United 
States, which the Nine and the European Commission were trying to revive at Castle 
Gymnich.128 Though there was no official end to the Year of Europe, and what the end date 
should be is interpreted differently by historians, the date on which this telegram was sent is a 
fitting moment to end the project. Kissinger had finally thrown in the towel, expecting no 
viable proceeds from it. Until the last moment, West Germany had tried, and failed, to 
produce a usable document. Yet they were continuously being opposed by France, who kept 
focusing on excluding the United States. 
Breakdown of the project 
The German sources show that Bonn was actually willing to cooperate with both the 
United States and the European nations, but that this proved quite difficult. Because the 
declaration had to be formed on behalf of all the European nations, the West Germans could 
not simply negotiate their own renewed alliance with the United States, but had to work 
through the EEC and the NATO. Even though West Germany was not immediately convinced 
by the project, as could be seen through the reluctance of Brandt and von Staden, they 
engaged with it nevertheless. After a few months a German declaration was developed and 
shown to Kissinger and Nixon, who were pleased to see that the West Germans put this effort 
into the project. The documents that Scheel presented were a declaration that could actually 
have progressed the Year of Europe, showing furthermore that West Germany wanted this 
project to succeed. Kissinger asked the Germans to keep the documents to themselves, so it 
would not get bogged down in the European bureaucracy. Only a few months later, exactly 
this had happened. Kissinger’s request can be attributed to a number of factors: for one, the 
European way of discussing and compromising was exasperatingly slow. Combined with the 
practice of a single spokesman, who was not allowed to do anything but present the European 
plans, this reduced working speed even more. Secondly there was the way in which countries 
had the power to block affairs of being executed, with in this particular case, the hesitance of 
France to work with the United States. Though West Germany did propose to work with the 
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United States and engage in the project, they did not actively stop France from stalling. They 
wanted to make the Year of Europe a success, but at the same time they did not want to create 
aversion from France, as good relations with France were needed in the European Community.  
 As the Yom Kippur War was fought, political priorities shifted with regard to 
European-American relations. It also caused a bilateral conflict between West Germany and 
the United States, because Bonn did not approve of the airbridge from Germany to Israel, as 
they wished to remain impartial. The United States thus complicated the situation by 
supplying Israel from West Germany. With only November and December left, there were 
two more occasions where European politics were discussed face-to-face. These were the 
meeting of the Political Committee and the NATO summit. Though the declaration was 
debated, there was no more clear West German declaration, nor input. The officials dealing 
with West Germany’s foreign affairs kept telling, as they had done all year, that Bonn put 
great value in a strong connection with the United States. This was true for officials in the 
United States, such as the ambassadors, but also for relations with the European countries, 
especially the Nine. In no way did officials ever truly speak out against the United States, nor 
against a more united Europe. By trying to balance between these two blocs the West 
Germans were not able to decisively put forward a proposal in either NATO or the EEC. As 
Kissinger also remarked in December, other European countries, especially France, were 
reluctant to tie themselves closer to the United States than West Germany was. Whereas the 
European identity at first had been part of their discourse with the United States, this was torn 
from the original designs of the declaration and had become a stand-alone entity, putting the 
interests of Europe before those of the transatlantic alliance. West Germany also participated 
in this, not wanting to do anything that would go against the grain of either party. The way in 
which a design for a European identity disrupted the relations between the United States and 
Europe showed the limit to how much could be accomplished at the moment. As the 
European nations were being incorporated into the EEC as individual nations, it sparked an 
internal struggle as to how they should interact with the United States. In this debate, France 
took a strong Euro-centric position and West Germany and Great Britain were not able to 
change this to a moderate stance, which they seemed to prefer, dealing with both Europe and 
the United States. 
When the relation between Europe and the United States dropped to a low point, the 
West German relation with the United States was dragged down with them. Throughout the 
project West Germany kept attempting to draft a proposal that included both a stronger and 
37 
 
more united Europe, and a stronger and more united Transatlantic Alliance. The French did 
not support this, because it would have given the United States more influence in Europe. 
Throughout the year they stalled Kissinger’s initiative. For example, in June, when the Nine 
had already decided to draft a document for September, Jobert remarked that they should not 
feel pressured, stating that “there is plenty of time. This is a long term-matter, and in forming 
its own identity Europe must act independently of America. It is not necessary for the EEC to 
rush ahead to break its own identity simply because it is going to have contacts with the 
Americans.”129 The June incident was only one of the many ways in which Jobert tried to 
disrupt the project and to keep the United States out of Europe. France wanted to use the Year 
of Europe for their own benefit and tried to shift the project, so it could be used to strengthen 
Europe itself, instead of the relation with the United States.130 
It is not strange then that Kissinger blamed Jobert personally for a great part of the 
stress he experienced during the year.131 The pressure exerted by France and the United States 
led to a situation in which the West Germans tried to ‘have their cake and eat it’, valuing both 
parties as important and thus being unable to make Europe move more towards the United 
States or invest more in Europe. From the West German side there was always the need to 
balance Ostpolitik with a strong Westpolitik, to make sure that they did not disrupt the 
relations with their allies in Europe and the United States. The necessity for this of course 
flowed from a multitude of reasons. They were still located between superpowers and could 
be the first to be attacked should the Soviet Union choose to make a move. So they chose to 
engage in communications with the Warsaw Pact, to diplomatically decrease the risk of such 
an event. Secondly, they had to strengthen their own position within the EEC. For this they 
needed to deal with eight other countries, with the biggest partners being France and Great 
Britain. It was in West Germany’s best interest not to upset any of these parties, lest it 
influence trade or diplomatic relations. Thirdly, they had to stay in a coalition with the United 
States, for economic, political and military reasons. This also coincides with the fourth reason 
that required West Germany to engage in a solid Westpolitik, NATO, to which the United 
States contributed the most. But as their Ostpolitik was working well, problems arose on the 
other side. To strengthen the EEC they had to give in to France, who focused on Europe and 
rejected intervention by the United States. But to meet the concerns of the United States, West 
Germany now needed to have both a bilateral relationship with the United States, but also 
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promote multilateral bonds, such as happened in the Year of Europe. This was complicated 
even more because West Germany, Great Britain, and numerous other European countries, 
but not France, were organized in NATO. This was together with the United States and this 
organization required cooperation. Being pulled on from multiple sides caused the lack of a 
hard decision from West Germany, who did not decide between choosing the European or 
American side in the Year of Europe, which contributed to the failure of the Year of Europe. 
And this failure of the Year of Europe had led to deteriorated relations between West 
Germany and the United States.  
Fabian Hilfrich argues that West Germany took a key role in the Year of Europe, 
functioning as a buffer between France and the United States. The Federal Republic had 
interests with both parties, to both keep the United States as a strong ally, but also France was 
needed to ensure more European integration. He explains this in The Strained Alliance, but 
comes short in his disquisition of the year, certainly in comparison to how it has been done in 
this thesis.132 Because what is important to notice, is that the relation with the United States 
actually became worse because Bonn did not manage to convey the importance they put in the 
relation with the United States to the other European nations, including France. Contrary to 
what Hilfrich argues, Bonn was not able to fulfill a buffer-role. While they were situated 
between the United States and France, they acted weakly on behalf of either of those countries. 
This led to angered American officials, who thought the West Germans did not put enough 
effort in the Year of Europe. So while Walter Scheel and Willy Brandt might have felt like 
they were on the barricades, the other nations did not notice this. Because they kept 
compromising with France on a bilateral level, they could not make it to a multilateral level 
that could have been part of the Year of Europe and of global politics. While the year could 
have become a success if this had been accomplished, it now remains to be seen as a failed 
attempt to change global politics. 
Counterarguments 
What is very important to notice, is how small of a part the Year of Europe played in 
German politics. Apart from the meetings that Brandt, Scheel and other politicians had, it is 
hardly mentioned. This goes for both business trips and official visits, but also for the German 
press, in which it is hardly mentioned, save for some news coverage shortly after the speech 
and during the year. Immediately after the speech these were positive cover stories, but 
already two weeks later, after Brandt and Scheel had visited Washington, political 
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commentators added to the coverage of the project, stating that it would not be an easy task to 
accomplish.133 Afterwards it was only brought to attention a few more times and did not play 
an important role in the media. 
Kissinger was also occupied with more issues during the Year of Europe, than just 
focusing on this project: in Hanhimäki’s book the few pages that focus on it are heavily 
embedded in paragraphs about the peace talks with Vietnam, visits to China, détente 
discussions with Russia, shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East and meetings with foreign 
officials in the United States.134 
Concerning France and Great Britain it can also be said that they were already too 
much involved in the project of trying to bring Europe together before the Year of Europe 
started. France was already quite Eurocentric and Great Britain had joined the EEC in 1973, 
with a Prime Minister who did not care as much for the ‘special relationship’ between the 
United States and Great Britain as Prime Ministers before him had done. They also wanted to 
prove that they were really committed to Europe, and not to the United States.135 Because of 
these pre-existing conditions the United States could not get real solid footing with two of the 
most important members of the European Community in 1973, regardless of what they would 
have done. 
Only exceptionally was the Year of Europe discerned outside of foreign politics, for 
example when Carsten Dubber, a member of the Evangelical Academy in Loccum, wrote to 
the deputy head of the United States department at the Foreign Ministry, dr. Citron. Through 
the Evangelical Academy he wanted to plan an event regarding the relations between the 
European Community and the United States and wanted to invite dr. Citron to be part of it.136 
Though a very enthusiastic letter that showed that there were people who took interest to the 
Year of Europe outside of the ministries, this is a rarity. The fact that there are very few of 
these letters in the archives of the Foreign Ministry shows a lack of public engagement.  
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Yet, Brandt’s statement from the Bundestag in 1974 was still true.137 The discussion 
about European – American relations was always present in West German foreign politics. 
From primary sources it can easily be ascertained that they did indeed occupy themselves 
with the Year of Europe on all fronts. Throughout the year officials had busied themselves 
with the project and tried to improve the relations with the United States and Europe on the 
basis of the speech by Kissinger. However, what they did, and how they tried to influence the 
other nations into participating in this project, was far from enough to make the Year of 
Europe a success.  
Chapter 3: the Aftermath 
Even during the Year of Europe it was already deemed a failed project. Not much had 
come from it declaration-wise, nor was foreign policy immediately affected by it. Instead of 
bringing the United States closer to Europe, Europe itself was becoming more united, needing 
less help from the United States, apart from military and nuclear guarantees. 
Nixon, occupied by the Watergate scandal, did not visit Europe for the Year of Europe, 
contributing to the failure of the initiative. This visit, initially planned in the latter half of the 
year, should have been the culmination of the project, where a declaration would be presented 
and signed by the European leaders and Nixon. And while European leaders visited 
Washington, Brandt and Scheel even multiple times during 1973, Nixon refused to come to 
Europe.  
For Willy Brandt, it had also been a personal failure. Stating in his memoirs that he 
had always been in favor of a good bond between the European Community and the United 
States, he was disappointed in the way Nixon and Kissinger had set it up and in the quarrels it 
had caused between the two regions. During the months after the speech, he confirms to have 
continuously urged his European colleagues to pay attention to the remarks Kissinger made 
and to adjust the European and American interest to each other as much as they could. In his 
memoirs, he did not show if the relations with the United States changed drastically, but he 
expressed his frustration with the European and American officials on a personal level.138 
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Personal discord 
In retrospect, it is clear how the Year of Europe became a failure not only due to 
irreconcilable differences between the various countries over priorities and other bilateral or 
multilateral involvements, but also because a number of the people involved did not take a 
liking to one another.139 When they were all replaced in the course of 1974 their successors 
took on a more open position towards the transatlantic relationship.140 
Piers Ludlow argues that the Year of Europe led to a beginning of changing attitudes 
towards Transatlantic relations. From 1974 onwards bilateral contacts between Washington 
and the three biggest European capitals, London, Paris and Bonn, increased and became more 
balanced when it concerned the European countries.141 Thus it can be argued that the Year of 
Europe did affect German – American and European – American relations, but certainly not 
in the way Kissinger had originally intended it. The Year of Europe had dragged the 
Transatlantic relations to such a low point, that the only way it could go from there was up. 
New faces 
Ludlow also asserts that the years of the Ford administration that succeeded Nixon 
were of a bigger importance than the original Year of Europe. After the Year of Europe, a lot 
changed on the stage of international politics. One after another, the leading actors of the year 
vanished from the stage. Willy Brandt resigned after his secretary was exposed as an East 
German spy, Pompidou had passed away, having been ill with cancer, Heath lost the election 
in England and Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal and his prospective 
impeachment.142 This gave space for new governments and enterprises. Early on this meant 
the passing of foreign policy resolutions that had not been possible before. One of these was 
the Schloss Gymnich resolution. It also reinstated the communications between Great Britain 
and the United States, which were on hold because of a disagreement, to how they were in 
July 1973, making bilateral contacts easier.143 This had previously been blocked by Jobert, but 
his successor Sauvagnargues was more open to relations with the United States. A similar 
development was visible with West Germany. Contrary to the Brandt years, Kissinger could 
get along quite good with Helmut Schmidt, the new chancellor. In August 1974, Kissinger 
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said that the alliance stood a chance now Ford and Schmidt could work together and he 
celebrated the change from Scheel and Brandt. The new French President Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson were also easier to work with on Atlantic 
issues, which overhauled the attitudes that had existed a year earlier.144 
A Declaration in NATO 
Another piece of legislation that only now found enough support was the Declaration 
on Atlantic Relations. On June 19th, NATO approved and published this declaration that 
would be signed by the Heads of NATO Government in Brussels a week later. This 
declaration can objectively be seen as a part of the legacy of Kissinger’s Year of Europe. The 
document reaffirmed the Atlantic Alliance, which upheld the ideas of a common defense 
strategy, the pursuit of détente and harmony between nations and other defense policies. 
Because it was solely a NATO document it did not deal with economic or political issues, safe 
for proclaiming that NATO is aimed at a free, democratic world.145 Neither the Year of 
Europe, nor the new Atlantic Charter were mentioned in the document, but this was the 
document that the European members of NATO had already drafted up in the autumn of 
1973.146 This was only a minor achievement, because it was mostly ceremonial and did not 
live very long.147 Though the declaration was heavily influenced by the Year of Europe, the 
declaration itself was not an influential piece of legislature, but Kissinger saw it as an 
accomplishment in achieving one of the practical goals of the Year of Europe.148 For all it was, 
this declaration did not radically alter foreign politics. It only slightly contributed to the 
renewal of the Atlantic Alliance, but not to the West German – United States relation in 
particular. 
Different from other periods? 
The Year of Europe stuck out from regular foreign relations because the United States 
tried to turn the multilateral conversations with the European countries into a single bilateral 
one. While they had always communicated with other countries one by one, they tried to 
impose cooperation on the European countries, who had only begun organizing in the 
European Community and were far from a European Union as it would be founded in 
Maastricht in 1992. Indications for this were Kissinger’s speech, that was aimed at Europe, 
instead of the separate countries, and the original plan to draft one document for both the EEC 
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and NATO together. The desire for an organized Europe was a logical one. Kissinger was a 
diplomat who worked very diligently, keeping tabs on multiple cases at once, but who was 
also continuously occupied by the Vietnam conflict during his years as National Security 
Advisor.149 But especially for him it was of great importance to unify Europe, because it was 
much easier to deal with a single block than with nine different countries. This desire also led 
to Kissinger’s biggest logical fallacy: because he already perceived the European countries as 
small and regional, that could easily be formed into single block, he hugely underestimated 
the conflicts of interest that existed between the countries. West Germany seemed willing to 
engage but other countries were more reluctant. Especially France did not want a ‘tenth 
member’ of the European community, in which the United States could very easily 
communicate and possibly influence the European members.150 
Conclusion 
Returning to the research questions, this conclusion will summarize how the relations 
between West Germany and the United States changed in 1973, if these relations changed 
because of and according to Kissinger’s speech, West Germany’s own reaction and their 
reaction through the EEC and NATO. The sub questions will be treated first. 
Were the relations affected by the Year of Europe as proposed in the speech by 
Kissinger? In 1973 West Germany was still implementing Ostpolitik, when Kissinger 
declared it the Year of Europe. From the primary sources it can be concluded that the project 
affected United States – West German relations. In West Germany, the initiative, though not 
embraced, was often present in foreign policy meetings and papers. Throughout the year, they 
kept a positive attitude towards the project and it can be seen that they tried to develop a new 
Atlantic Charter, or Declaration of Principles. This actually went fairly good, with Scheel 
presenting Nixon and Kissinger with an initial German proposal in July. The proposal was 
very well received by the Americans, but it was not yet a totally worked-out, nor a European 
declaration. Shortly hereafter however, the development of a declaration devolved into chaos. 
Instead of one, two declarations were being drafted, neither of which the United States were 
particularly keen on. This did not discourage the West Germans and they kept on drafting a 
Declaration of Principles until 1974. Even though West Germany tried to engage with the 
project, they were unable to do this. The possibility existed, certainly during the first part of 
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the year, to change the relations with United States and to improve them. However, West 
Germany was not alone in the Year of Europe and regardless of their efforts, they did not 
succeed in revitalizing the relations between themselves, Europe, and the United States as 
proposed by Kissinger. 
How did West Germany react to the Year of Europe project? The West German 
reaction to the Year of Europe cannot be seen apart from the already existing relationship 
between West Germany and the United States. After being defeated and split up after the war, 
West Germany developed a good connection with the United States. This can partially be 
attributed to the aid the United States provided, but it was also thanks to the chancellors that 
were in charge. For most of the time, this role was in the hands of Konrad Adenauer who, 
certainly in his early years as chancellor, was very pro-American. His successors Erhard and 
Kiesinger retained a friendly bond with the United States too. 
The same cannot be said for Brandt’s government, that never tried to thwart the 
American administration, but did have conflicts of interest and personal differences. But in 
public these differences seemed to be put aside. Brandt and Scheel met with Nixon and 
Kissinger just a week after the speech, though this visit had been planned earlier. Regardless, 
they still discussed the speech and seemed to take it seriously. West Germany then engaged 
with the project in 1973 and this can be seen in a lot of correspondence with United States 
officials. In primary sources it can be seen that the project was being worked on throughout 
the year, with numerous proposals being drafted and discussed. Scheel oversaw all of this and 
throughout the year met up with his European colleagues and Kissinger to discuss the 
initiative. However, there was no big public West German reaction. This also had to do with 
the fact that it was a European project, and not just between Germany and the United States.  
In that case, how did West Germany react through the EEC and NATO? For this it is 
important to see how the Year of Europe fits into the chronology of the EEC and NATO. In 
1973, the EEC was extended to nine members, including Great Britain and France. France 
was not a member of NATO at this moment. The EEC was still in a nascent from and not 
used to discussing international relations multilaterally. This led to a situation in which no 
European nation wholeheartedly took it upon itself to start drafting a declaration, or even to 
get all countries on the same page. France and its foreign minister, Jobert, in particular did not 
want to acquiesce to the wishes of the United States and executed a different policy, which 
tried to ostracize the United States in favor of a more united Europe. And because France was 
45 
 
not part of NATO they did not want to link issues related to safety, so two documents had to 
be drafted. The EEC worked tediously slow and France also tried to block the project. All 
these issues did not stop West Germany from still trying to make a success out of the Year of 
Europe, with Scheel even defending the fact that the project needed to be a success in NATO. 
However, they needed to juggle both the relations with the European countries and the United 
States. Therefore they were not able to act powerfully and a strong reaction through NATO or 
the EEC was not visible or transmitted. This left them open for criticism from both their own 
countrymen and that of the United States. They saw a politically weak West Germany, that 
was more interested in its own Ostpolitik than a strong Atlantic alliance and détente. Though a 
NATO-declaration was signed in 1974 in the spirit of the Year of Europe, it was not an 
important one, nor did it have any actual influence in the long run. 
Arriving at the main question: how did the United States – West German relations 
change in 1973 and 1974 during the Year of Europe? Partially this can be seen as a 
continuation of the relations as they were from 1969 up to 1973. Though there was no conflict, 
the relation was not at an apex. Nonetheless, in 1973 and 1974 the relations between West 
Germany and the United States did worsen. This was because of the failure of the Year of 
Europe and West Germany’s failure to engage with it in a way that the United States could 
notice. West Germany did not manage to comfort the United States, because of their weak 
position between the European nations and the United States. Lacking the authority to force 
France and other countries to engage with the project in a way that Kissinger wanted and 
unable to tell the United States that they couldn’t meet their requirements, they found 
themselves between a rock and a hard place. This led to a deterioration of the relation from 
where it already was, combined with the factors already described in this conclusion. 
However, the blame cannot only be put on West Germany. West Germany, together 
with the other European nations, had from day one requested Nixon’s participation in the 
project to make it a success. The reluctance with which the president engaged, or rather failed 
to engage, in making the plan a success can be understood in retrospect, because of the 
Watergate scandal. Yet, by postponing his visit to Europe instead of cancelling it, it 
contributed to dragging out the project and its eventual failure. Instead of offering a different 
solution, Nixon’s visit was promised until far in the year, only agitating the other participants 
when it was delayed yet again. This certainly cooled of the relationship between the two 
countries from the West German side. Next to the Year of Europe, the Yom Kippur War left 
its mark on the relationship in 1973. Though the war was fought in the Middle-East without 
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European combatants, it put a lot of strain on the European countries, who did not support the 
war, nor the way in which the Israelis and Arab countries were supplied. For example, the 
United States flew supply flights for the Israelis out of West Germany, which was heavily 
condemned by Scheel. Together with already existing frictions concerning the fighting of 
wars, such as Vietnam, acts like this were judged negatively by West Germany. An incidental 
result of the Yom Kippur War was the Energy Crisis. While it did not hit West Germany very 
hard, it still disturbed the country. These issues took the wind out of the sails of the Year of 
Europe even more, as resources were needed to respond elsewhere.151  
 Taking all of this into consideration, it can be concluded that the relationship between 
the United States and West Germany got worse than it already was. The failure of the project, 
together with West Germany’s seemingly weak engagement in it, the involvement of the other 
European countries and external factors like Watergate and the Yom Kippur War can all be 
counted as reasons that this happened. 
Concerning the subject of the Year of Europe in West Germany, and in general, there 
are still other important things to notice: the abundance of information far surpasses the 
commonly held view of Germany’s role in the Year of Europe. Most authors put little value in 
the role of the Bundesrepublik and scan over the Year of Europe as just a ripple in the pond of 
international politics. Either to Europe as a whole or to individual countries they only dedicate 
a little attention in a few sentences, but this has led to an incomplete history. Though the 
project itself was not a success, it did have an influence in international politics, because of 
when it was organized. 1973 ended up being a year in the middle of global changes. The ties 
with China and the Soviet Union had become better, a more united Europe was slowly 
forming. Détente provided a climate in which there was less tension between the nuclear 
powerhouses, but still proxy-wars such as in Vietnam and Israel were fought. But concerning 
politics, the Year of Europe, the new Atlantic Charter and the European Declaration of 
Principles continuously played a role during discussions, which were not ‘business as usual’, 
but driven by the speech Kissinger had given and how the European countries had engaged it. 
During 1973 and leading into 1974, the three key phrases regarding the project, Year of 
Europe, New Atlantic Charter and Declaration of Principles, were continuously present in 
both West German and American sources. This is with such a frequency that it cannot be 
ignored. No written account yet summarizes the West German side of the Year of Europe 
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month-by-month, which has led to the lack of an analysis of the entire year. What has been 
written in this thesis has not yet been described as such and the relation between West 
Germany, its connection to the Year of Europe, the United States and other geopolitical 
developments was not yet entirely clear. However, next to the already utilized sources, there 
is still a vast amount of sources that remain to be studied. One reason for this is that some of 
these sources have only recently been unsealed or made available to the greater public. For 
instance, the diplomatic cables of the United States regarding this period have only been 
released in 2005 and the Akten zur Auswärtigen Politk der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1973 
have only been made available in 2004, though only in certain libraries and archives. Because 
of the speed at which these archives are being unlocked, there is now more than ever the 
possibility to do research on projects like the Year of Europe, next to subjects that have 
already gotten a lot of attention, such as Ostpolitik and the war in the Middle East.  
It cannot be said with any certainty that the Year of Europe would have been a success 
if it had not suffered from setbacks such as the Middle East-crisis or Nixon’s involvement in 
Watergate. Even then it would still have been a very tough issue to get the European countries 
to cooperate without getting hung-up on technicalities, or getting the Europeans together to 
discuss the project, let alone reconcile their differences about working together with the 
United States. What is left to the reader’s own interpretation is an excerpt from Willy Brandt 
regarding the year 1973: “Ich möchte hier meine Meinung und die Meinung meiner 
politischen Freunde zum Ausdruck bringen – ich sage es in einer Paraphrase –: Nach meiner 
festen Überzeugung warden Historiker des nächsten Jahrzehnts oder der nächsten 
Generationen mit höchster Wahrscheinlichkeit das Jahr 1973 als einen tiefgreifenden 
Einschnitt in der Nachkriegsgeschichte, als eine historische Zäsur bewerten.”152  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
152
 Deutscher Bundestag – 7. Wahlperiode – 91. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag den 28. März 1974.  
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